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Delegation effects in representative democracies: do they foster extremism?

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  • Laussel, Didier

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  • Laussel, Didier, 2002. "Delegation effects in representative democracies: do they foster extremism?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 191-205, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:85:y:2002:i:2:p:191-205
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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
    3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Representative democracy and capital taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 53-70, September.
    4. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    5. Chari, V V & Jones, Larry E & Marimon, Ramon, 1997. "The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 957-976, December.
    6. Canzoneri,Matthew B. & Grilli,Vittorio & Masson,Paul R. (ed.), 1992. "Establishing a Central Bank," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521420983, Enero-Abr.
    7. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1992. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701.
    8. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    9. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-265, March.
    10. Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L. Judd, 2006. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly: Corrigendum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1367-1367, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Elie Appelbaum, 2006. "Strategic extremism," Working Papers 2006_12, York University, Department of Economics.
    2. Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2009. "On the Strategic Use of Representative Democracy in International Agreements," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(2), pages 281-296, April.
    3. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2007. "Political extremism in the presence of a free rider problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 31-40, October.
    4. Eerola Essi & Määttänen Niku & Poutvaara Panu, 2004. "Citizens Should Vote on Secession," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-22, October.

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