IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Strategic aspects of vertical delegation

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Caillaud, Bernard
  • Rey, Patrick

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co9422.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by CEPREMAP in its series CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) with number 9422.

as
in new window

Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 1994
Handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:9422
Contact details of provider: Postal:
48 boulevard Jourdan - 75014 PARIS

Phone: +33(0) 1 43 13 62 30
Fax: +33(0) 1 43 13 62 32
Web page: http://www.cepremap.fr/

More information through EDIRC

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Fershtman, Chaim & Kalai, Ehud, 1997. "Unobserved Delegation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(4), pages 763-774, November.
  2. Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  3. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1998. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 64-103, February.
  4. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
  5. Patrick Bolton & Michael D. Whinston, 1993. "Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 121-148.
  6. Michael L. Katz, 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 307-328, Autumn.
  7. David Martimort, 1996. "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, Spring.
  8. Rey, Patrick & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1988. "Vertical restraints and producers' competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(2-3), pages 561-568, March.
  9. Caillaud Bernard & Hermalin Benjamin, 1993. "The Use of an Agent in a Signalling Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 83-113, June.
  10. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-265, March.
  11. Comanor, William S & Frech, H E, III, 1985. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 539-546, June.
  12. Schwartz, Marius, 1987. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1063-1068, December.
  13. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
  14. Rasmusen, Eric B & Ramseyer, J Mark & Wiley, John S, Jr, 1991. "Naked Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1137-1145, December.
  15. repec:crs:wpaper:9312 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
  17. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno & Picard, Pierre, 1993. "Competing vertical structures : precommitment and renegotiation. revised version," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9304, CEPREMAP.
  18. Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356.
  19. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1987. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1057-1062, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as
in new window


Cited by:

  1. Caprice, Stéphane & von Schlippenbach, Vanessa & Wey, Christian, 2014. "Supplier Fixed costs and Retail Market Monopolization," TSE Working Papers 14-524, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  2. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf & Dae-Hee Yoon, 2008. "Friction in Related-Party Trade When a Rival Is Also a Customer," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(11), pages 1850-1860, November.
  3. Fiocco, Raffaele, 2016. "The strategic value of partial vertical integration," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 284-302.
  4. Jansen, Jos, 2003. "Coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 699-716, May.
  5. Irmen, Andreas, 1998. " Precommitment in Competing Vertical Chains," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(4), pages 333-359, September.
  6. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "A Primer on Foreclosure," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
  7. Reisinger, Markus & Thomes, Tim Paul, 2017. "Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure," DICE Discussion Papers 261, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  8. repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00555 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Avenel, E. & Caprice, S., 2006. "Upstream market power and product line differentiation in retailing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 319-334, March.
  10. Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2014. "Organizational structure, strategic delegation and innovation in oligopolistic industries," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 1-24, January.
  11. Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2012. "Vertical Separation with Private Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(559), pages 173-207, 03.
  12. Alain Bayet & Fabienne Rosenwald, 1997. "Relations verticales, intégration et barrières à l'entrée," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 48, pages 227-251.
  13. Stéphane Caprice & Vanessa Schlippenbach, 2013. "One-Stop Shopping as a Cause of Slotting Fees: A Rent-Shifting Mechanism," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 468-487, 09.
  14. Michiel Bijlsma & Gijsbert Zwart, 2009. "Competition for access; spectrum rights and downstream access in wireless telecommunications," CPB Discussion Paper 123, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  15. Natarajan, Ramachandran & Sethuraman, Kannan & Surysekar, Krishnamurthy, 2005. "Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 162(3), pages 816-838, May.
  16. Povel, Paul & Raith, Michael, 2004. "Financial constraints and product market competition: ex ante vs. ex post incentives," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(7), pages 917-949, September.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Access and download statistics

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpm:cepmap:9422. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Stéphane Adjemian)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.