Strategic aspects of vertical delegation
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- Caillaud, Bernard & Rey, Patrick, 1995. "Strategic aspects of vertical delegation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 421-431, April.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Fiocco, Raffaele, 2016.
"The strategic value of partial vertical integration,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 284-302.
- Fiocco, Raffaele, 2014. "The strategic value of partial vertical integration," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 455, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Fiocco, Raffaele, 2016. "The strategic value of partial vertical integration," Working Papers 2072/267267, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2007.
"A Primer on Foreclosure,"
Handbook of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier.
- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "A Primer on Foreclosure," IDEI Working Papers 203, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Nov 2005.
- Reisinger, Markus & Thomes, Tim Paul, 2017. "Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure," DICE Discussion Papers 261, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Avenel, E. & Caprice, S., 2006. "Upstream market power and product line differentiation in retailing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 319-334, March.
- Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2012.
"Vertical Separation with Private Contracts,"
Economic Journal,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(559), pages 173-207, March.
- Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2010. "Vertical Separation with Private Contracts," CSEF Working Papers 251, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Jul 2011.
- Alain Bayet & Fabienne Rosenwald, 1997. "Relations verticales, intégration et barrières à l'entrée," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 48, pages 227-251.
- Michiel Bijlsma & Gijsbert Zwart, 2009. "Competition for access; spectrum rights and downstream access in wireless telecommunications," CPB Discussion Paper 123, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Natarajan, Ramachandran & Sethuraman, Kannan & Surysekar, Krishnamurthy, 2005. "Reducing incremental costs associated with the delegation of incentive contracting decisions: An analysis of planning and control decisions in a manufacturing setting in the presence of moral hazard," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 162(3), pages 816-838, May.
- Caprice, Stéphane & Von Schlippenbach, Vanessa & Wey, Christian, 2014.
"Supplier Fixed costs and Retail Market Monopolization,"
TSE Working Papers
14-524, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Stéphane Caprice & Vanessa von Schlippenbach & Christian Wey, 2014. "Supplier Fixed Costs and Retail Market Monopolization," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1408, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Caprice, Stéphane & von Schlippenbach, Vanessa & Wey, Christian, 2014. "Supplier fixed costs and retail market monopolization," DICE Discussion Papers 164, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00555 is not listed on IDEAS
- Stéphane Caprice & Vanessa Schlippenbach, 2013.
"One-Stop Shopping as a Cause of Slotting Fees: A Rent-Shifting Mechanism,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 468-487, September.
- Caprice, Stéphane & von Schlippenbach, Vanessa, 2013. "One-stop shopping as a cause of slotting fees: A rent-shifting mechanism," DICE Discussion Papers 97, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
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