IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cdl/econwp/qt79b870w0.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments

Author

Listed:
  • Katz, Michael L.

Abstract

The players in most economically important games are agents, not principals. This raises the possibility of the principal's setting a strategic compensation scheme. The central question addressed here is whether unobservable agency contracts can serve as precommitments. I argue that, in terms of Nash equilibrium outcomes, the answer is no when it is common knowledge that there exists a contract that "solves" the standard agency problems and that the principal and agent have the same preferences over income and effort. However, I also show that when these conditions are not satisfied (as they typically will not be), provisions of the agency contract enacted solely to deal with incentive and risk sharing problems of the agency relationship may have the secondary effect of credibly precommitting the agent in the game he plays with other agents. I also briefly consider the effects of contract renegotiation.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Katz, Michael L., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt79b870w0, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt79b870w0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/79b870w0.pdf;origin=repeccitec
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Olivier J. Blanchard & Lawrence H. Summers, 1986. "Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Volume 1, pages 15-90 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Quah, Danny, 1989. "The Dynamic Effects of Aggregate Demand and Supply Disturbances," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 655-673, September.
    3. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1973. "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 326-334, June.
    4. Balke, Nathan S & Gordon, Robert J, 1989. "The Estimation of Prewar Gross National Product: Methodology and New Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 38-92, February.
    5. Tamim Bayoumi, 1990. "Saving-Investment Correlations: Immobile Capital, Government Policy, or Endogenous Behavior?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 37(2), pages 360-387, June.
    6. Stephen W. Salant & Dale W. Henderson, 1976. "Market anticipations, government policy, and the price of gold," International Finance Discussion Papers 81, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. J. Bradford De Long and Barry Eichengreen., 1991. "The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program," Economics Working Papers 91-184, University of California at Berkeley.
    8. Stockman, Alan C., 1988. "Real exchange-rate variability under pegged and floating nominal exchange-rate systems: An equilibrium theory," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, pages 259-294.
    9. Eichengreen, Barry, 1989. "The Comparative Performance of Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes: Interwar Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-325, August.
    11. Tamim Bayoumi, 1992. "The Effect of the ERM on Participating Economies," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 39(2), pages 330-356, June.
    12. Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, 1992. "Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification," NBER Working Papers 3949, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Matthew Shapiro & Mark Watson, 1988. "Sources of Business Cycles Fluctuations," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 111-156 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Feldstein, Martin & Horioka, Charles, 1980. "Domestic Saving and International Capital Flows," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(358), pages 314-329, June.
    15. Eichengreen, Barry, 1990. "Trends and Cycles in Foreign Lending," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt82z7083m, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    16. Barsky, Robert B., 1987. "The Fisher hypothesis and the forecastability and persistence of inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 3-24, January.
    17. Salant, Stephen W & Henderson, Dale W, 1978. "Market Anticipations of Government Policies and the Price of Gold," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(4), pages 627-648, August.
    18. Alogoskoufis, George S & Smith, Ron, 1991. "The Phillips Curve, the Persistence of Inflation, and the Lucas Critique: Evidence from Exchange-Rate Regimes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1254-1275, December.
    19. John A. Carlson, 1977. "A Study of Price Forecasts," NBER Chapters,in: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 6, number 1, pages 27-56 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. John Hewson & Eisuke Sakakibara, 1977. "The effectiveness of German controls on capital inflow," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 113(4), pages 645-666, December.
    21. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt79b870w0. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lisa Schiff). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ibbrkus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.