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Financial constraints and product market competition: ex ante vs. ex post incentives

  • Povel, Paul
  • Raith, Michael

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V8P-4CVX58W-1/2/9aba5ee561d728074680b1e5f1a6497f
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 22 (2004)
Issue (Month): 7 (September)
Pages: 917-949

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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:22:y:2004:i:7:p:917-949
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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  3. Cleary, Sean & Povel, Paul E M & Raith, Michael, 2004. "The U-Shaped Investment Curve: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 4206, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Steven M. Fazzari & R. Glenn Hubbard & BRUCE C. PETERSEN, 1988. "Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 19(1), pages 141-206.
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  8. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
  9. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, 2000. "Product market competition and optimal debt contracts: The limited liability effect revisited," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1823-1840, December.
  10. Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Dan Kovenock & Gordon M Phillips, 1995. "Capital Structure and Product Market Behavior: An Examination of Plant Exit and Investment Decisions," Working Papers 95-4, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
  12. Katz, Michael L., 1991. "Game-Playing Agents: Unobservable Contracts as Precommitments," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt79b870w0, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  13. Dan Kovenock & Gordon M Phillips, 1995. "Capital Structure And Product Market Rivalry: How Do We Reconcile Theory And Evidence?," Working Papers 95-3, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
  14. Michael Raith, 2003. "Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1425-1436, September.
  15. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
  16. Paul Povel & Michael Raith, 2004. "Optimal Debt with Unobservabable Investments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 599-616, Autumn.
  17. Maurer, Boris, 1999. "Innovation and investment under financial constraints and product market competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 455-476, May.
  18. Chevalier, Judith A, 1995. " Do LBO Supermarkets Charge More? An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of LBOs on Supermarket Pricing," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1095-1112, September.
  19. Hendel, Igal, 1996. "Competition under Financial Distress," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 309-24, September.
  20. Showalter, Dean M, 1995. "Oligopoly and Financial Structure: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 647-53, June.
  21. Maggi, Giovanni, 1996. "Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Mode of Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 237-58, March.
  22. Vojislav Maksimovic, 1988. "Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 389-407, Autumn.
  23. Chevalier, Judith A & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Capital-Market Imperfections and Countercyclical Markups: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 703-25, September.
  24. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of incomplete contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19354, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  25. Showalter, Dean, 1999. "Strategic debt: evidence in manufacturing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 319-333, April.
  26. James A. Brander & Tracy R. Lewis, 1988. "Bankruptcy Costs and the Theory of Oligopoly," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(2), pages 221-43, May.
  27. Phillips, Gordon M., 1995. "Increased debt and industry product markets An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 189-238, February.
  28. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1995. "The Role of Games in Security Design," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(2), pages 327-67.
  29. Opler, Tim C & Titman, Sheridan, 1994. " Financial Distress and Corporate Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(3), pages 1015-40, July.
  30. Khanna, Naveen & Tice, Sheri, 2000. "Strategic Responses of Incumbents to New Entry: The Effect of Ownership Structure, Capital Structure, and Focus," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(3), pages 749-79.
  31. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
  32. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
  33. Rune Stenbacka & Mihkel Tombak, 2002. "Investment, Capital Structure, and Complementarities Between Debt and New Equity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(2), pages 257-272, February.
  34. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 83-114, January.
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