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Endettement des firmes et comportements de rivalité : l’apport des principaux modèles en économie industrielle

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  • Le Pape, Nicolas

    (G.E.M.M.A.-L.E.R.E., Faculté de Sciences Économiques et de Gestion, Université de Caen)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present, to analyze and to compare models in the field of industrial organization in which firms can strategically use their debt in order to influence the market structure or the degree of competition within the industry. The original feature of this particular trend in industrial organization is shown. It is essentially based on the new function of the strategic interaction instrument in association with the debt contract. An examination of the relationship between the characteristics of the production game and the debt strategic behavior constitute the purpose of this paper. First, we consider the influence of the debt on the collusive/competitive dimension of the industry or on the acquisition of a monopolistic power. Second, we examine the impact of the debt on an entry game. L’objet de ce papier est de présenter, d’analyser et de comparer des modèles d’économie industrielle dans lesquels on démontre que les firmes sont en mesure de tirer parti stratégiquement de leur niveau d’endettement afin d’influencer leur positionnement sur un marché ou le degré de concurrence dans une industrie. L’originalité de ce courant particulier de l’économie industrielle repose essentiellement sur la fonction stratégique, distincte de la fonction incitative, reconnue au contrat de dette. Nous examinons la nature de la liaison que l’on peut établir entre les caractéristiques des jeux de production et un comportement stratégique d’endettement des firmes sur deux plans. Tout d’abord en considérant l’influence de l’endettement sur la dimension collusive/concurrentielle d’une industrie et sur les conditions d’acquisition d’un pouvoir de monopole entre firmes installées. Ensuite, en soulignant l’impact de la dette sur des stratégies de pénétration de nouveaux marchés.

Suggested Citation

  • Le Pape, Nicolas, 2001. "Endettement des firmes et comportements de rivalité : l’apport des principaux modèles en économie industrielle," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 77(2), pages 281-302, juin.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:77:y:2001:i:2:p:281-302
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