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The U-Shaped Investment Curve: Theory and Evidence

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Listed:
  • Cleary, Sean
  • Povel, Paul
  • Raith, Michael

Abstract

We analyze how the availability of internal funds affects a firm's investment. We show that under fairly standard assumptions, the relation is U-shaped: investment increases monotonically with internal funds if they are large but decreases if they are very low. We discuss the tradeoff that generates the U-shape, and argue that models predicting an always increasing relation are based on restrictive assumptions. Using a large data set, we find strong empirical support for our predictions. Our results qualify conventional wisdom about the effects of financial constraints on investment behavior, and help to explain seemingly conflicting findings in the empirical literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Cleary, Sean & Povel, Paul & Raith, Michael, 2007. "The U-Shaped Investment Curve: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 1-39, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:42:y:2007:i:01:p:1-39_00
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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