Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry
Countries often perceive themselves as being in competition with each other for profitable international markets. In such a world export subsidies can appear as attractive policy tools, from a national point of view, because they improve the relative position of a domestic firm in noncooperative rivalries with foreign firms, enabling it to expand its market share and earn greater profits. In effect, subsidies change the initial conditions of the game that firms play. The terms of trade move against the subsidizing country, but its welfare can increase because, under imperfect competition, price exceeds the marginal cost of exports. International noncooperative equilibriumis characterized by such subsidies on the part of exporting nations, even though they are jointly suboptimal.
|Date of creation:||Sep 1984|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Brander, James A. and Barbara J. Spencer. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Vol. 18, No. 1-2, (Feb. 1985), pp. 83-100.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1983.
"Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly,"
NBER Working Papers
1236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406.
- A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1980.
"Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry,"
414, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1981. "Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 14(3), pages 371-89, August.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982.
"International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy,"
518, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 707-722.
- Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1984.
"Trade warfare: Tariffs and cartels,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 16(3-4), pages 227-242, May.
- Avinash K. Dixit & Gene M. Grossman, 1984.
"Targeted Export Promotion with Several Oligopolistic Industries,"
NBER Working Papers
1344, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dixit, Avinash K. & Grossman, Gene M., 1986. "Targeted export promotion with several oligopolistic industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 233-249, November.
- Frenkel, Jacob A, 1971. "On Domestic Demand and Ability to Export," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(3), pages 668-72, May-June.
- J. de V. Graaff, 1949. "On Optimum Tariff Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 47-59.
- Pursell, G. & Snape, R. H., 1973. "Economies of scale, price discrimination and exporting," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 85-91, February.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1979.
"The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
140, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Rieber, William J, 1982. "Discriminating Monopoly and International Trade," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(366), pages 365-76, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1464. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.