The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence
The theory of large-scale entry into an industry is made complicated by its game-theoretic aspects. Even in the simplest case of one established firm facing one prospective entrant, there are some subtle strategic interactions. The established firm's pre-entry decisions can influence the prospective entrant's view of what will happen if he enters, and the established firm will try to exploit this possibility to its own advantage.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Volume (Year): 90 (1980)
Issue (Month): 357 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2 Dean Trench Street, Westminster, SW1P 3HE|
Phone: +44 20 3137 6301
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:90:y:1980:i:357:p:95-106. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.