Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry
This paper examines the incentives for using tariffs to extract monopoly rents from imperfectly competitive foreign firms. Using a simple Stackelberg entry deterrence model, the rent-extracting policy is attractive if the foreign firm faces a threat of domestic entry. Despite transportation costs, the Stackelberg leader-follower model can lead to intra-industry trade in the same commodity.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1980|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6|
Phone: (613) 533-2250
Fax: (613) 533-6668
Web page: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:414. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Babcock)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.