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Using the allocation of emission permits for Strategic Trade purposes

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When the market of tradable emissions permits is perfectly competitive, free allocation of permits through some discretionary rules corresponds to lump sum transfers and cannot have strategic effects. This conclusion is reversed when transactions costs are introduced in the TEP market. Transactions costs proportional to the value of permits exchanged create a gap between selling and the buying price, thus resulting in lower opportunity costs for the holder of excess permits. This can be effectively exploited by a government in order to encourage its firm to gain larger share in an international market. When costs per transaction are fixed, the above effects disappear for those firms participating in the market. For small firms, however, participation may be prohibitively expensive, turning the opportunity cost of any permits hold, equal to zero. This suggests that free permits may create strategic effects within the hands of small firms but not when granted to larger firms.

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  • Christos Constantatos & Lefteris Filippiadis & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2011. "Using the allocation of emission permits for Strategic Trade purposes," Discussion Paper Series 2011_09, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Jun 2011.
  • Handle: RePEc:mcd:mcddps:2011_09
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    Keywords

    Tradeable Emissions Permits; strategic trade policy.;

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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