Distributing Pollution Rights in Cap-and-Trade Programs: Are Outcomes Independent of Allocation?
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- Meredith Fowlie & Jeffrey M. Perloff, 2013. "Distributing Pollution Rights in Cap-and-Trade Programs: Are Outcomes Independent of Allocation?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(5), pages 1640-1652, December.
- Fowlie, Meredith & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 2008. "Distributing pollution rights in cap-and-trade programs: are outcomes independent of allocation?," CUDARE Working Papers 47002, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
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More about this item
Keywordsair pollution; emissions trading; transaction costs;
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
- Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
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