Tradeable emission permits regulations in the presence of imperfectly competitive product markets: Welfare implications
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References listed on IDEAS
- Besanko, David, 1987. "Performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 19-44, October.
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Keywordsemission permits; oligopoly; welfare;
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