Tradeable Emission Permits in Oligopoly
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References listed on IDEAS
- Foster, Vivien & Hahn, Robert W, 1995. "Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons from Los Angeles Smog Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 19-48, April.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1980.
"The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
- Dixit, Avinash, 1979. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 140, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
- B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1981. "Capital, Commitment, and Entry Equilibrium," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 593-604, Autumn.
- Baumol,William J. & Oates,Wallace E., 1988. "The Theory of Environmental Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521322249, December.
- Malueg, David A., 1990. "Welfare consequences of emission credit trading programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 66-77, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kjell Sunnevåg, 2003. "Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(3), pages 385-400, November.
- Harrie A.A. Verbon & Cees A. Withagen, 2004. "Tradable emission permits in a federal system," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/83, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2004. "On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 27(1), pages 1-19, January.
- Dafna Eshel & Richard Sexton, 2009. "Allowing communities to trade in imperfectly competitive pollution-permit markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 60-82, August.
- Dafna Eshel, 2005. "Optimal Allocation of Tradable Pollution Rights and Market Structures," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 205-223, September.
More about this item
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
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