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Financial intermediaries and emissions trading market development and pricing strategies

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  • Heindl, Peter

Abstract

This paper examines the role of intermediaries in quantity regulation theoretically and presents a data application to the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The choice of regulated firms to trade permits through intermediaries or directly at the exchange is discussed. Permit pricing strategies of intermediaries and possible issues of market power of intermediaries are modeled. Based on empirical data, the model application aims to assess the actual costs (fees, fixed costs) from permit trading, which represent costs of transacting. In a competitive setup, costs are relatively modest with about 1% to 2% of the permit price. In the EU ETS, firms that trade more than 283,000t CO2/year are likely to directly access the exchange while others trade with intermediaries. In the unlikely event of an intermediary having market power, overall costs would be six times higher in the model application. Options for regulated firms to access a permit exchange directly at low costs decrease the costs of transacting considerably in a competitive and non-competitive intermediary market.

Suggested Citation

  • Heindl, Peter, 2012. "Financial intermediaries and emissions trading market development and pricing strategies," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:12064
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marc Baudry & Anouk Faure & Simon Quemin, 2020. "Emissions Trading with Transaction Costs," Working Papers 2007, Chaire Economie du climat.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    permit trading; financial intermediaries; market power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

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