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Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy Towards Dynamic Oligopolies

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  • Neary, J.P.
  • Leahy, D.

Abstract

We characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's "fat cats and top dogs" taxonomy of business strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Neary, J.P. & Leahy, D., 1998. "Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy Towards Dynamic Oligopolies," Papers 98/14, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:dublec:98/14
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    TRADE POLICY ; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT;

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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