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Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy Towards Dynamic Oligopolies

  • Neary, J.P.
  • Leahy, D.

We characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's "fat cats and top dogs" taxonomy of business strategies.

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Paper provided by College Dublin, Department of Political Economy- in its series Papers with number 98/14.

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Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:dublec:98/14
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Ireland; University College Dublin, Department of Political Economy, Centre for Economic Research, Belfield, Dublin 4

Phone: +353-1-7067777
Fax: +353-1-283 0068
Web page: http://www.ucd.ie/economics/

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  1. Leahy, Dermot & Neary, J Peter, 1996. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy without Government Commitment," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 322-38, October.
  2. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Working Papers 518, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  3. D. Leahy & J. P. Neary, 1997. "R&D spillovers and the case for industrial policy in an open economy," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20342, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  4. Maggi, Giovanni, 1996. "Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Mode of Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 237-58, March.
  5. Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Theories of oligopoly behavior," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 329-414 Elsevier.
  6. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1983. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," NBER Working Papers 1236, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 522-530, Autumn.
  8. J. Peter Neary, 1990. "Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games : should governments help winners or losers?," Working Papers 199008, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
  9. Leahy, Dermot & Neary, J Peter, 1995. "Public Policy Towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries," CEPR Discussion Papers 1243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
  11. A. M. Spence, 1981. "The Learning Curve and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 49-70, Spring.
  12. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-37, December.
  13. Spence, Michael, 1984. "Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 101-21, January.
  14. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-66, May.
  15. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 707-722.
  16. Dermot Leahy & J. Peter Neary, 1999. "Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-Industry Promotion," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 447-474.
  17. Dixit, Avinash K. & Grossman, Gene M., 1986. "Targeted export promotion with several oligopolistic industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 233-249, November.
  18. Neary, J Peter, 1989. "Export Subsidies and Price Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 327, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Maskin, Eric S & Newbery, David M, 1990. "Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 143-56, March.
  20. James A. Brander, 1995. "Strategic Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 5020, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. To, Theodore, 1994. "Export subsidies and oligopoly with switching costs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1-2), pages 97-110, August.
  22. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1989. "The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in Oligopolistic Industries," Discussion Papers 869, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  23. Neary, J Peter, 1989. "Trade Liberalization and Shadow Prices in the Presence of Tariffs and Quotas," CEPR Discussion Papers 345, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  24. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1987. "Foreign direct investment with unemployment and endogenous taxes and tariffs," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3-4), pages 257-279, May.
  25. Karp, Larry S. & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 1995. "The failure of strategic industrial policies due to manipulation by firms," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 1-16.
  26. Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou, 1995. "Strategic Export Promotion in the Absence of Government Precommitment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 407-26, May.
  27. Dixit, Avinash, 1979. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 140, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  28. A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn.
  29. Paul Klemperer, 1995. "Competition when Consumers have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 515-539.
  30. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, June.
  31. Gruenspecht, Howard K., 1988. "Export subsidies for differentiated products," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3-4), pages 331-344, May.
  32. David de Meza, 1986. "Export Subsidies and High Productivity: Cause or Effect?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 19(2), pages 347-50, May.
  33. Carmichael, Calum M., 1987. "The control of export credit subsidies and its welfare consequences," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 1-19, August.
  34. D Leahy & J.P. Neary, 1995. "Learning by Doing," CEP Discussion Papers dp0251, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  35. Vives, Xavier, 1989. "Technological competition, uncertainty, and oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 386-415, August.
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