Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games : should governments help winners or losers?
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Other versions of this item:
- Neary, J. Peter, 1994. "Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games: Should governments help winners or losers?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 197-218.
- Neary, J Peter, 1991. "Cost Asymmetries in International Subsidy Games: Should Governments Help Winners or Losers?," CEPR Discussion Papers 560, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Neary, James Peter, 1991. "Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games: Should governments help winners or losers?," Discussion Papers, Series II 147, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
References listed on IDEAS
- J. Peter Neary, 1988. "Export subsidies and national welfare," Working Papers 198809, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
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KeywordsExport subsidies--Econometric models; Oligopolies; Competition;
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