Cost Asymmetries in International Subsidy Games: Should Governments Help Winners or Losers?
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.
Other versions of this item:
- Neary, J. Peter, 1994. "Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games: Should governments help winners or losers?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 197-218, November.
- Neary, James Peter, 1991. "Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games: Should governments help winners or losers?," Discussion Papers, Series II 147, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
- J. Peter Neary, 1990. "Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games : should governments help winners or losers?," Working Papers 199008, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
References listed on IDEAS
- J. Peter Neary, 1988. "Export subsidies and national welfare," Working Papers 198809, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
Most related itemsThese are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
- Walsh, Patrick, 1991.
"A general framework for analysing endogenous trade divergences,"
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics
6780, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Patrick Paul Walsh, 1991. "A General Framework for Analysing Endogenous Trade Divergences," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 04, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Mann, S., 2001. "Das Konzept der „Verwaltungselastizität“ am Beispiel der Exporterstattungen in Deutschland," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 37.
More about this item
KeywordsCournot/Bertrand Competition; Export Subsidies; Industrial Policy; Strategic Trade Policy;
All these keywords.
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:560. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.