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Strategic Export Promotion in the Absence of Government Precommitment

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  • Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou

Abstract

Arguments in favor of a strategic trade policy are based on the assumption that the government can credibly precommit to a policy that will not be altered, even if it is suboptimal ex post. This paper examines the implications of relaxing this assumption; to this end, a three-stage game is considered that accounts for the sunk costs associated with capacity installment. It is found that--contrary to common belief--the time-consistent optimal subsidy level is positive, though generally lower than the optimal level with precommitment. This somewhat counterintuitive result is driven by the commitment value of capacity. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou, 1995. "Strategic Export Promotion in the Absence of Government Precommitment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 407-426, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:36:y:1995:i:2:p:407-26
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    Cited by:

    1. Bilgehan Karabay, 2009. "Lobbying Under Asymmetric Information," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 1-41, March.
    2. Desai, Mihir A. & Hines Jr., James R., 2008. "Market reactions to export subsidies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 459-474, March.
    3. Neary, J Peter & Leahy, Dermot, 2000. "Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 484-508, April.
    4. Dewit, Gerda & Leahy, Dermot, 2004. "Rivalry in uncertain export markets: commitment versus flexibility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 195-209, October.
    5. José Luis Moraga Gonzales & Jean-Marie Viaene, 2001. "Procompetitive Trade Policies," CESifo Working Paper Series 597, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2003. "Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time consistency of environmental policy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 197-214, May.
    7. Kresimir Zigic, 2011. "Strategic Interactions in Markets with Innovative Activity: The Cases of Strategic Trade Policy and Market Leadership," CERGE-EI Books, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague, edition 1, number b06, November.
    8. Neary, J Peter & O'Sullivan, Paul, 1999. " Beat 'Em or Join 'Em? Export Subsidies versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(4), pages 577-596, December.
    9. Žigić, Krešimir, 2011. "Does a ‘non-committed’ government always generate lower social welfare than its ‘committed’ counterpart? Strategic trade policy when consumer surplus matters," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 533-556.
    10. Maggi, G. & Grossman, G., 1997. "Free Trade vs Strategic Trade: A Peek into Pandora's Box," Papers 190, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    11. Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose Luis & Viaene, Jean-Marie, 2005. "Trade policy and quality leadership in transition economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 359-385, February.
    12. Dong, Quan & Bárcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos, 2015. "Does investment in capacity encourage FDI?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 58-64.
    13. Hamilton, Stephen F. & Stiegert, Kyle W., 2002. "An empirical test of the rent-shifting hypothesis: the case of state trading enterprises," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 135-157, October.
    14. Herguera, Iñigo & Kujal, Praveen & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 1997. "Non-credible policies and leap-frogging in a vertically differentiated industry," UC3M Working papers. Economics 6067, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    15. Young-Han Kim, 1999. "The Welfare Analysis of Trade Policies: The Optimal Government Intervention Timing under Incomplete Information," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(4), pages 53-70.
    16. Kresimir Zigic, 2010. "Second-Best Trade Policies, R&D Spillovers and Government (In)ability to Precommit in an Intra-Industry Trade Framework," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp427, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    17. Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez & Jean-Marie Viaene, 2003. "An Example of Procompetitive Trade Policies," Working Papers 504, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
    18. Hernán, Roberto & Kujal, Praveen, 2003. "Minimum quality levels and import tariffs," UC3M Working papers. Economics we034817, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    19. Delia Baghdasaryan & Kresimir Zigic, 2010. "Tariffs, market conduct and government commitment," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 18(1), pages 91-122, January.

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