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Beat'Em Or Join'Em? Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets

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  • Neary, J.P.
  • O'Sullivan, P.

Abstract

This paper compares adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D. When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete.

Suggested Citation

  • Neary, J.P. & O'Sullivan, P., 1998. "Beat'Em Or Join'Em? Export Subsidies Versus International Research Joint Ventures in Oligopolistic Markets," Papers 98/10, College Dublin, Department of Political Economy-.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:dublec:98/10
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Neary, J Peter & Leahy, Dermot, 2000. "Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 484-508, April.
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    15. Dermot Leahy & J. Peter Neary, 1999. "Learning by Doing, Precommitment and Infant-Industry Promotion," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(2), pages 447-474.
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    Cited by:

    1. Neary, J Peter & Leahy, Dermot, 2000. "Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy towards Dynamic Oligopolies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(463), pages 484-508, April.
    2. Dewit, Gerda & Leahy, Dermot, 2004. "Rivalry in uncertain export markets: commitment versus flexibility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 195-209, October.
    3. Jo, Seung-gyu & den Butter, Frank A. G., 2009. "Pros and Cons of Backing Winners in Innovation Policy," MPRA Paper 17658, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Alireza Naghavi & Dermot Leahy, 2006. "Intellectual Property Rights and Entry into a Foreign Market: FDI vs. Joint Ventures," Working Papers 2006.97, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Alireza Naghavi & Dermot Leahy, 2008. "Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Joint Ventures," Center for Economic Research (RECent) 017, University of Modena and Reggio E., Dept. of Economics "Marco Biagi".
    6. Haaland, Jan I. & Kind, Hans Jarle, 2008. "R&D policies, trade and process innovation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 170-187, January.
    7. Aikaterini KOKKINOU, 2010. "Economic growth, innovation and collaborative research and development activities," Management & Marketing, Economic Publishing House, vol. 5(1), Spring.
    8. Julie DeCourcy, 2005. "Cooperative R&D and strategic trade policy," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(2), pages 546-573, May.
    9. Julie DeCourcy, 2007. "Research Joint Ventures And International Competitiveness: Evidence From The National Cooperative Research Act," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(1), pages 51-65.
    10. Alireza Naghavi, 2003. "Strategic Intellectual Property Protection Policy and North-South Technology Transfer," Working Papers 200313, School of Economics, University College Dublin.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ; TRADE POLICY ; EXPORTS ; SUBSIDIES ; OLIGOPOLIES;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General

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