Exclusivity and Antitrust in Media Markets: The Case of Pay-TV in Europe
This paper challenges the traditional economic reasons supporting copyright licensing exclusivity in dealership agreements in media markets. It is argued how exclusive dealings in contents distributions acted in Europe as barriers to entry and/or raising rivals' costs strategies against new Pay-TV operators. The removal of exclusive dealing clauses, as recently implemented by the European Commission, can be economically justified when it generates positive impact on technological innovation and on the development of alternative transmission platforms for the delivery of multimedia services. Recent European Antitrust decisions seem to encourage a new 'open access approach' for premium contents distribution in media industry.
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Volume (Year): 12 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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