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Essential Facility Access in Europe: Building a Test for Antitrust Policy

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Listed:
  • Castaldo Angelo

    (University of Rome)

  • Nicita Antonio

    (University of Siena)

Abstract

This paper investigates the evolution of competition policy decisions in the US and, particularly, in the EU, concerning mandatory access to an essential facility held by a dominant firm. Based on some recent and controversial EU antitrust decisions, we outline a comprehensive test for identifying an essential facility and consequently imposing a mandatory access obligation on dominant firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Castaldo Angelo & Nicita Antonio, 2007. "Essential Facility Access in Europe: Building a Test for Antitrust Policy," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 83-110, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:3:y:2007:i:1:n:6
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1078
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Nicita, 2013. "Managing Strategically Outside Options under Incomplete Contracts," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 361-374, September.
    2. Valentiny, Pál & Kiss, Károly Miklós, 2009. "A nélkülözhetetlen eszközök értelmezése és a postai szolgáltatások [The interpretation of essential facilities and the postal services]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1001-1024.
    3. Patrice Bougette & Axel Gautier & Frédéric Marty, 2021. "Which access to which assets for an effective liberalization of the railway sector?," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 22(2), pages 87-110, June.
    4. Filippo Belloc & Antonio Nicita, 2011. "The political determinants of liberalization: do ideological cleavages still matter?," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 58(2), pages 121-145, June.

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