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The theory of access pricing and interconnection

  • Armstrong, Mark

This paper surveys the theory of access pricing and interconnection in telecommunicatons. One-way access pricing, competition bottlenects and two-way access pricing are discussed.

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File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15608/1/MPRA_paper_15608.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 15608.

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Date of creation: May 2001
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15608
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  1. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 73-100, March.
  2. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1998. "The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 115-21, March.
  3. Poletti, Stephen & Wright, Julian, 2004. "Network interconnection with participation constraints," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 347-373, September.
  4. Gans, Joshua S, 2001. "Regulating Private Infrastructure Investment: Optimal Pricing for Access to Essential Facilities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 167-89, September.
  5. Gans, Joshua S & Williams, Philip L, 1999. "Access Regulation and the Timing of Infrastructure Investment," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 75(229), pages 127-37, June.
  6. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Marcus, Scott & Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2001. "Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle," IDEI Working Papers 130, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  7. Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Lim, Yoonsung, 2001. "An economic analysis of the receiver pays principle," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 231-260, June.
  8. Wouter Dessein, 2000. "Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-22, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  9. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 38-56, Spring.
  10. Armstrong, M. & Doyle, C. & Vickers, J., 1995. "The access pricing problem: a synthesis," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9532, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  11. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I--Production Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 8-27, March.
  12. De Fraja, Gianni, 1999. "Regulation and access pricing with asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 109-134, January.
  13. Crew, Michael A & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1998. "Efficient Entry, Monopoly, and the Universal Service Obligation in Postal Service," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 103-25, September.
  14. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1993. "Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 335-59, December.
  15. de Bijl, P.W.J. & Peitz, M., 2004. "Dynamic Regulation and Entry in Telecommunications Markets : A Policy Framework," Discussion Paper 2004-010, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  16. Gans, J.S. & King, S.P., 2000. "Mobile Network Competition, Customer Ignorance and Fixed-to-Mobile Call Prices," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 734, The University of Melbourne.
  17. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Access Pricing and Competition," Working papers 94-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  18. Acton, Jan Paul & Vogelsang, Ingo, 1992. "Telephone Demand over the Atlantic: Evidence from Country-Pair Data," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 305-23, September.
  19. Economides, Nicholas, 1998. "The incentive for non-price discrimination by an input monopolist," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 271-284, May.
  20. Armstrong, Mark, 1997. "Mobile telephony in the UK," MPRA Paper 35405, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  21. Mandy, David M, 2000. "Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 157-72, March.
  22. Sibley, David S. & Weisman, Dennis L., 1998. "Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 451-470, December.
  23. Jong-Hee Hahn, 2000. "Network Competition and Interconnection with Heterogeneous Subscribers," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2000/11, Department of Economics, Keele University.
  24. Little, Iain & Wright, Julian, 2000. "Peering and Settlement in the Internet: An Economic Analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 151-73, September.
  25. Vickers, John, 1997. "Regulation, Competition, and the Structure of Prices," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 15-26, Spring.
  26. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 227-56, November.
  27. Domon, Koji & Kiyono, Kazuharu, 1999. "A Voluntary Subsidy Scheme for the Accounting Rate System in International Telecommunications Industries," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 151-65, September.
  28. Doh-Shin Jeon & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2004. "On the Receiver-Pays Principle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 85-110, Spring.
  29. Wright, Julian, 1999. "International Telecommunications, Settlement Rates, and the FCC," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 267-91, May.
  30. Vickers, John, 1996. "Market Power and Inefficiency: A Contracts Perspective," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 11-26, Winter.
  31. R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, 1956. "The General Theory of Second Best," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 11-32.
  32. Lapuerta, Carlos & Tye, William B., 1999. "Promoting effective competition through interconnection policy," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 129-145, March.
  33. repec:oup:restud:v:62:y:1995:i:1:p:1-17 is not listed on IDEAS
  34. Weisman, Dennis L, 1995. "Regulation and the Vertically Integrated Firm: The Case of RBOC Entry into Interlata Long Distance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-66, November.
  35. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, June.
  36. repec:oup:restud:v:62:y:1995:i:4:p:515-39 is not listed on IDEAS
  37. Cave, Martin & Donnelly, Mark P., 1996. "The pricing of international telecommunications services by monopoly operators," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 107-123, June.
  38. repec:eee:ecolet:v:71:y:2001:i:3:p:413-42 is not listed on IDEAS
  39. Lee, Sang Hyup & Hamilton, Jonathan H, 1999. "Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 223-48, May.
  40. Hakim, Sam Ramsey & Lu, Ding, 1993. "Monopolistic settlement agreements in international telecommunications," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 145-157, July.
  41. Mark Armstrong, 2001. "Access Pricing, Bypass, and Universal Service," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 297-301, May.
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