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Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition

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  • Lewis, Tracy R.
  • Sappington, David E. M.

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Suggested Citation

  • Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 73-100, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:iepoli:v:11:y:1999:i:1:p:73-100
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Esther Gal-or, 1986. "Information Transmission—Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 85-92.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 1-37.
    4. Robert Gertner & Robert Gibbons & David Scharfstein, 1988. "Simultaneous Signalling to the Capital and Product Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 173-190.
    5. Bernard, Andrew B. & Jensen, J. Bradford, 1997. "Exporters, skill upgrading, and the wage gap," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 3-31.
    6. Sibley, David S. & Weisman, Dennis L., 1998. "Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, pages 451-470.
    7. Armstrong, M., 1996. "Network interconnection," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9625, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    8. Howard F. Chang, 1995. "Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 34-57.
    9. Tracy R. Lewis & David E.M. Sappington, 1995. "Optimal Capital Structure in Agency Relationships," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 343-361.
    10. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1998. "The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 115-121, March.
    11. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 38-56.
    12. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-150, June.
    13. Gertner, Robert H. & Gibbons, Robert. & Scharfstein, David., 1987. "Simultaneous signaling to the capital and product markets," Working papers 1917-87., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    14. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, pages 227-256.
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    16. Ebrill, Liam P. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Production efficiency and optimal pricing in intermediate-good regulated industries," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, pages 417-442.
    17. Lode Li, 1985. "Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 521-536.
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    19. Yossef Spiegel & Daniel F. Spulber, 1997. "Capital Structure with Countervailing Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 1-24.
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    22. Nicolas Curien & Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, 1998. "Pricing Regulation Under Bypass Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 259-279.
    23. Yossef Spiegel & Daniel F. Spulber, 1997. "Capital Structure with Countervailing Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 1-24.
    24. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "A Note on Environmental Innovation," IDEI Working Papers 41, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    25. Lode Li, 1985. "Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, pages 521-536.
    26. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "Optimal Bypass and Cream Skimming," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, pages 1042-1061.
    27. Carl Shapiro, 1986. "Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 433-446.
    28. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Access pricing and competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1673-1710, December.
    29. J. Gregory Sidak & William Baumol, 1994. "Toward Competition in Local Telephony," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 52984.
    30. Weisman, Dennis L, 1995. "Regulation and the Vertically Integrated Firm: The Case of RBOC Entry into Interlata Long Distance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, pages 249-266.
    31. Schankerman, Mark, 1996. "Symmetric regulation for competitive telecommunications," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, pages 3-23.
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