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Asymmetric information and exchange of information about product differentiation

Author

Listed:
  • António Brandão

    (CEF.UP, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto, Portugal)

  • Joana Pinho

    (Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto, Portugal)

Abstract

We introduce asymmetric information about consumers' transportation costs (i.e., the degree of product differentiation) in the model of Hotelling (1929). When the transportation costs are high, both firms have lower profits than in the case of perfect information. Contrarily, both firms may prefer the asymmetric information case if the transportation costs are low (the informed firm always prefers the informational advantage, while the uninformed firm may or may not prefer to remain uninformed). Information sharing is ex-ante advantageous for the firms, but ex-post damaging in the case of low transportation costs. If the information is not verifiable, the informed firm always tends to announce that the transportation cost is high. To induce truthful revelation: (i) the uninformed firm must pay for the informed firm to confess that the transportation costs are low; and (ii) the informed firm must make a payment (to the uninformed firm or to a third party) for the uninformed firm to believe that the transportation costs are high.

Suggested Citation

  • António Brandão & Joana Pinho, 2010. "Asymmetric information and exchange of information about product differentiation," FEP Working Papers 379, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    • Handle: RePEc:por:fepwps:379
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. He Li & Erbao Cao, 2023. "Competitive crowdfunding under asymmetric quality information," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 329(1), pages 657-688, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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