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The interconnection prices in telecomunications: from theory to practice

Author

Listed:
  • Joan Calzada

    () (Universidad de Barcelona)

  • Francesc Trillas

    () (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona)

Abstract

This paper evaluates the main measures that have been used to regulate the interconnection prices in the telecommunication sector. We show that many of the regulations that are applying the vast majority of countries have very little theoretical support, and we identify the restrictions that prevent a more efficient intervention in the sector. In order to conduct this research, we firstly review the results of the theoretical literature on one and two-ways interconnections and we explain the problems that the national regulatory agencies have had when introducing the lessons of the academic contributions in their regulations. Secondly, we analyse the cost orientated interconnection prices, which are at present the regulatory practices most widely used. We evaluate the efficiency of some versions of this mechanism and explain the efforts that are being made to improve it.

Suggested Citation

  • Joan Calzada & Francesc Trillas, 2005. "The interconnection prices in telecomunications: from theory to practice," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 85-125, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:hpe:journl:y:2005:v:173:i:2:p:85-125
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Telecommunications; regulation; interconnection; access charges;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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