IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Mobile Termination and Consumer Expectations under the Receiver-Pays Regime

We analyze how termination charges affect retail prices when taking into account that receivers derive some utility from a call and when firms may charge consumers for receiving calls. A novel feature of our paper is that we consider passive self-fulfilling expectations and do not allow for negative reception charges. We reconfirm the finding of profit neutrality when firms cannot use termination-based price discrimination and show that connectivity is prone to breakdown.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.netinst.org/Hurkens_Lopez_10-12.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number 10-12.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:1012
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.NETinst.org/

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Sjaak Hurkens & Doh-Shin Jeon, 2009. "Mobile Termination and Mobile Penetration," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 777.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. Sjaak Hurkens & Ángel L. López, 2010. "Mobile Termination, Network Externalities, and Consumer Expectations," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 812.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Dessein, Wouter, 2004. "Network competition with heterogeneous customers and calling patterns," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 323-345, September.
  4. Dewenter, Ralf & Kruse, Jörn, 2011. "Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 107-117, March.
  5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 1-37, Spring.
  6. Joan Calzada & Tommaso M. Valletti, 2008. "Network Competition and Entry Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1223-1244, 08.
  7. Doh-Shin Jeon & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2004. "On the Receiver-Pays Principle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 85-110, Spring.
  8. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 2004. "Sender or Receiver: Who Should Pay to Exchange an Electronic Message?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 423-447, Autumn.
  9. Hahn, Jong-Hee, 2003. "Nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 949-967, September.
  10. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 38-56, Spring.
  11. de Bijl, P.W.J. & Brunekreeft, G. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Larouche, P. & Shelkoplyas, N. & Sorana, V., 2005. "Interconnected Networks," Discussion Paper 2005-007, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  12. Berger, Ulrich, 2005. "Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 107-112, January.
  13. L. Randall Wray & Stephanie Bell, 2004. "Introduction," Chapters,in: Credit and State Theories of Money, chapter 1 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  14. Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2001. "Using 'bill and keep' interconnect arrangements to soften network competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 413-420, June.
  15. Peitz, Martin & Valletti, Tommaso M. & Wright, Julian, 2004. "Competition in telecommunications: an introduction," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 315-321, September.
  16. Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2009. "Mobile Call Termination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(538), pages 270-307, June.
  17. Dessein, Wouter, 2003. " Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(4), pages 593-611, Winter.
  18. Berger Ulrich, 2005. "Access Charges in the Presence of Call Externalities," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
  19. Patrick Degraba, 2003. "Efficient Intercarrier Compensation for Competing Networks When Customers Share the Value of A Call," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 207-230, 06.
  20. Harbord David & Pagnozzi Marco, 2010. "Network-Based Price Discrimination and `Bill-and-Keep' vs. `Cost-Based' Regulation of Mobile Termination Rates," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-46, February.
  21. Ingo Vogelsang, 2003. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(3), pages 830-862, September.
  22. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Marcus, Scott & Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2003. " Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 370-390, Summer.
  23. Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2009. "Mobile Call Termination Revisited," TSE Working Papers 10-198, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Aug 2010.
  24. Steffen Hoernig & Roman Inderst & Tommaso Valletti, 2014. "Calling circles: network competition with nonuniform calling patterns," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 155-175, March.
  25. Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso, 2005. "Information Exchange and Competition in Communications Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 5031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  26. Carlo Cambini & Tommaso M. Valletti, 2008. "INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND COMPETITION IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 707-728, December.
  27. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-564, May.
  29. Philippe Robert-Demontrond & R. Ringoot, 2004. "Introduction," Post-Print halshs-00081823, HAL.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:1012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nicholas Economides)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.