Calling Circles: Network Competition with Non-Uniform Calling Patterns
We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with non-uniform calling patterns, which account for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small set of contacts. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is affected by the concentration of calling patterns. Contrary to previous predictions, jointly profit-maximizing access charges are set above termination cost in order to dampen competition, and the resulting on-net prices are below off-net prices, if calling patterns are sufficiently concentrated. We discuss implications for regulating access charges as well as on- and off-net price discrimination.
|Date of creation:||04 Jul 2011|
|Date of revision:||04 Jul 2011|
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