This paper surveys recent economic research on price discrimination, both in monopoly and oligopoly markets. Topics include static and dynamic forms of price discrimination, and both final and input markets are considered. Potential antitrust aspects of price discrimination are highlighted throughout the paper. The paper argues that the informational requirements to make accurate policy are very great, and with most forms of price discrimination a laissez-faire policy may be the best available in practical terms. However, careful case-by-case analysis of situations involving selective price cuts and margin squeeze seems worthwhile.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2006|
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- Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1993.
"Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 335-59, December.
- Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1998. "The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 115-21, March.
- Yongmin Chen, 1997. "Paying Customers to Switch," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(4), pages 877-897, December.
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