Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power to practice both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 61 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0022-1821|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1999.
"Customer Poaching and Brand Switching,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1871, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Gehrig, Thomas & Shy, Oz & Stenbacka, Rune, 2011. "History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 732-739, June.
- Taylor, Curtis R., 2000.
"Supplier Surfing: Competition and Consumer Behavior in Subscription Markets,"
00-12, Duke University, Department of Economics.
- Taylor, Curtis R, 2003. " Supplier Surfing: Competition and Consumer Behavior in Subscription Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 223-46, Summer.
- Yongmin Chen, 2008. "DYNAMIC PRICE DISCRIMINATION WITH ASYMMETRIC FIRMS -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 729-751, December.
- Amit Pazgal & David Soberman, 2008. "Behavior-Based Discrimination: Is It a Winning Play, and If So, When?," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(6), pages 977-994, 11-12.
- Valletti, Tommaso M & Hoernig, Steffen & Barros, Pedro P, 2002.
"Universal Service and Entry: The Role of Uniform Pricing and Coverage Constraints,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics,
Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 169-90, March.
- Barros, Pedro Luis Pita & Hoernig, Steffen & Valletti, Tommaso, 2001. "Universal Service and Entry: the Role of Uniform Pricing and Coverage Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 2789, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1993.
"Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation,"
Journal of Industrial Economics,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 335-59, December.
- J. Miguel Villas-Boas, 1999. "Dynamic Competition with Customer Recognition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(4), pages 604-631, Winter.
- Armstrong, Mark & Porter, Robert, 2007. "Preface to the Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Price discrimination," MPRA Paper 4693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yongmin Chen, 1997. "Paying Customers to Switch," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(4), pages 877-897, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:61:y:2013:i:1:p:62-83. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.