IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Should uniform pricing constraints be imposed on entrants?

  • Steffen Hoernig

    ()

This paper analyzes uniform pricing, coverage constraints and price caps in markets newly opened to competition, e.g. broadband services. We show that the requirement of uniform pricing has strong repercussions on coverage decisions. Imposed on incumbents only it may distort their coverage decision downward to avoid duopoly entry. If also imposed on entrants it increases the likelihood that entry leads to independent monopolies rather than competition. A sufficiently large coverage constraint on incumbents reestablishes incentives for duopoly entry, but may lead to higher prices. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11149-006-0013-6
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 30 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (08)
Pages: 199-216

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:30:y:2006:i:2:p:199-216
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1993. "Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 335-59, December.
  2. Chone, Philippe & Flochel, Laurent & Perrot, Anne, 2000. "Universal service obligations and competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 249-259, September.
  3. Hoerning, Steffen, 2002. "Should Uniform Pricing Constraints be Imposed on Entrants?," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp417, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  4. Faulhaber, Gerald R & Hogendorn, Christiaan, 2000. "The Market Structure of Broadband Telecommunications," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 305-29, September.
  5. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-66, May.
  6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, June.
  7. Hoernig, Steffen, 2005. "Should Uniform Pricing Contraints be Imposed on Entrants?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5052, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Anton, James J. & Vander Weide, James H. & Vettas, Nikolaos, 2002. "Entry auctions and strategic behavior under cross-market price constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 611-629, May.
  9. S. Baranzoni & P. Bianchi & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Market Structure," Working Papers 368, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  10. Valletti, Tommaso M & Hoernig, Steffen & Barros, Pedro P, 2002. "Universal Service and Entry: The Role of Uniform Pricing and Coverage Constraints," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 169-90, March.
  11. Foros, Oystein & Kind, Hans Jarle, 2003. "The Broadband Access Market: Competition, Uniform Pricing and Geographical Coverage," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 215-35, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:30:y:2006:i:2:p:199-216. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

or (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.