IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-00144073.html

Universal service obligations and competition

Author

Listed:
  • Anne Perrot

    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - GENES - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - GENES - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Laurent Flochel

    (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENS LSH - Ecole Normale Supérieure-Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Philippe Choné

    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - GENES - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - GENES - Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We provide some elements to assess and compare various regulatory rules for the allocation and funding of universal service obligations (USOs). We restrict ourselves to ubiquity and spatial non discrimination constraints. We examine the welfare consequences of two systems: First, a regulation where USOs are imposed only on the incumbent firm (restricted-entry regulation) and second, a 'pay or play' rule where the entrant may serve non profitable users. Whereas pay or play regulation dominates when only the ubiquity constraint is at work, this result no longer holds when non discrimination is added. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.We provide some elements to assess and compare various regulatory rules for the allocation and funding of universal service obligations (USOs). We restrict ourselves to ubiquity and spatial non discrimination constraints. We examine the welfare consequences of two systems: First, a regulation where USOs are imposed only on the incumbent firm (restricted-entry regulation) and second, a `pay or play' rule where the entrant may serve non profitable users. Whereas pay or play regulation dominates when only the ubiquity constraint is at work, this result no longer holds when non discrimination is added.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Perrot & Laurent Flochel & Philippe Choné, 2000. "Universal service obligations and competition," Post-Print halshs-00144073, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00144073
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00144073. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.