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Access by Capacity and Peak-Load Pricing


  • Joan Calzada Aymerich

    (Universitat de Barcelona)


Several European telecommunications regulatory agencies have recently introduced a fixed capacity charge (flat rate) to regulate access to the incumbents network. The purpose of this paper is to show that the optimal capacity charge and the optimal access-minute charge analysed by Armstrong, Doyle, and Vickers (1996) have a similar structure and imply the same payment for the entrant. I extend the analysis to the case where there is a competitor with market power. In this case, the optimal capacity charge should be modified to avoid that the entrant cream-skims the market, fixing a longer or a shorter peak period than the optimal. Finally, I consider a multiproduct setting, where the effect of the product differentiation is exacerbated.

Suggested Citation

  • Joan Calzada Aymerich, 2003. "Access by Capacity and Peak-Load Pricing," Working Papers in Economics 108, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  • Handle: RePEc:bar:bedcje:2003108

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Access pricing and competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1673-1710, December.
    2. Burness, H Stuart & Patrick, Robert H, 1991. "Peak-Load Pricing with Continuous and Interdependent Demand," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 69-88, March.
    3. Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 1999. "Interconnection in Network Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 14(1), pages 1-25, February.
    4. Griffin, James M & Mayor, Thomas H, 1987. "The Welfare Gain from Efficient Pricing of Local Telephone Services," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 465-487, October.
    5. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-150, June.
    6. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 227-256, November.
    7. Craven, John, 1985. "Peak-Load Pricing and Short-run Marginal Cost," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(379), pages 778-780, September.
    8. Koschat, Martin A & Srinagesh, Padmanabhan & Uhler, Linda J, 1995. "Efficient Price and Capacity Choices under Uncertain Demand: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 5-26, January.
    9. Robert E. Dansby, 1978. "Capacity Constrained Peak Load Pricing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 387-398.
    10. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Access pricing with unregulated downstream competition," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 73-100, March.
    11. Crew, Michael A & Kleindorfer, Paul R & Smith, Marc A, 1990. "Peak-Load Pricing in Postal Services," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(402), pages 793-807, September.
    12. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Michael Reutter, 2001. "Regulation and Internet Access in Germany," CESifo Working Paper Series 480, CESifo Group Munich.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joan Calzada, 2007. "Capacity-based versus time-based access charges in telecommunications," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 153-172, October.
    2. Joan Calzada & Francesc Trillas, 2005. "The interconnection prices in telecomunications: from theory to practice," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 85-125, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets


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