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Endogenous Average Cost Based Access Pricing

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  • Kenneth Fjell
  • Øystein Foros
  • Debashis Pal

Abstract

We analyze an endogenous average cost based access pricing rule,where both the regulated firm and its rivals realize the interdependence among their output and the regulated access price. In contrast, the existing literature on access pricing has always assumed the access price to be exogenously fixed ex-ante. We show that endogenous access pricing fully neutralizes the dominance enjoyed by the incumbent firm, and that the consumer surplus is equal to or larger than under exogenous access pricing. If the entrants are more efficient than the incumbent, then the welfare under endogenous access pricing is higher than under exogenous access pricing.
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Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth Fjell & Øystein Foros & Debashis Pal, 2010. "Endogenous Average Cost Based Access Pricing," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(2), pages 149-162, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:36:y:2010:i:2:p:149-162
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-010-9238-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Access pricing and competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1673-1710, December.
    2. Mandy David M. & Sharkey William W., 2003. "Dynamic Pricing and Investment from Static Proxy Models," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(4), pages 1-37, December.
    3. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-150, June.
    4. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Øystein Foros & Hans Kind & Lars Sørgard, 2007. "Managerial incentives and access price regulation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 117-133, April.
    6. Biglaiser, Gary & DeGraba, Patrick, 2001. "Downstream Integration by a Bottleneck Input Supplier Whose Regulated Wholesale Prices Are Above Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 302-315, Summer.
    7. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 227-256, November.
    8. Cave, Martin & Vogelsang, Ingo, 0. "How access pricing and entry interact," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(10-11), pages 717-727, November.
    9. Economides, N. & Lopomo, G. & Woroch, G., 1996. "Regulatory Rules to Neutralize Network Dominance," Working Papers 96-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    10. David E. M Sappington, 2005. "On the Irrelevance of Input Prices for Make-or-Buy Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1631-1638, December.
    11. Economides, Nicholas & Lopomo, Giuseppe & Woroch, Glenn, 1996. "Regulatory Pricing Rules to Neutralize Network Dominance," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 5(4), pages 1013-1028.
    12. Ingo Vogelsang, 2003. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(3), pages 830-862, September.
    13. Chone, Philippe & Flochel, Laurent & Perrot, Anne, 2002. "Allocating and funding universal service obligations in a competitive market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(9), pages 1247-1276, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Federico Boffa & John Panzar, 2012. "Bottleneck co-ownership as a regulatory alternative," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 201-215, April.
    2. Kenneth Fjell & Øystein Foros & Hans Jarle Kind, 2015. "On the Choice of Royalty Rule to Cover Fixed Costs in Input Joint Ventures," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(3), pages 393-406, November.
    3. Øystein Foros & Hans Kind & Lars Sørgard, 2007. "Managerial incentives and access price regulation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 117-133, April.
    4. Kenneth Fjell & Debashis Pal & David Sappington, 2013. "On the performance of endogenous access pricing," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 237-250, December.
    5. Steffen Hoernig & Ingo Vogelsang, 2012. "The ambivalence of two-part tariffs for bottleneck access," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp568, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    6. Chi-Chih Lin, 2016. "Can Total Deregulation Be A Better Option Than Partial Deregulation?," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 61(04), pages 1-16, September.

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