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Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing

Author

Listed:
  • Nicholas Economides
  • Giuseppe Lopomo
  • Glenn Woroch

Abstract

This innovative book provides state-of-the-art analyses of the current condition of the economics of digital markets. The most recent developments in web technology are evolving, creating an increasingly deregulated environment. Much of the impetus for liberalisation is in response to multimedia convergence and the globalisation of markets, leading to uncertainties in the sector.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Nicholas Economides & Giuseppe Lopomo & Glenn Woroch, 2005. "Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing," Working Papers 05-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ste:nystbu:05-10
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    File URL: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/economics/docs/workingpapers/2005/05-10Economides.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Edmond Baranes & Laurent Flochel, 2003. "Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities," Post-Print halshs-00178580, HAL.
    2. Nicholas Economides, 2006. "Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction," Chapters, in: Dennis W. Jansen (ed.), The New Economy and Beyond, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Edmond Baranes & Laurent Flochel, 2003. "Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities Concurrence et fusions entre réseaux avec externalités d’appels," Working Papers 0308, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    4. Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 1999. "Interconnection in Network Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 14(1), pages 1-25, February.
    5. Nicholas Economides & Giuseppe Lopomo & Glenn Woroch, 1997. "Regulatory Pricing Policies to Neutralize Network Dominance," Industrial Organization 9612003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Yu-Shan Lo, "undated". "Market Shares, Consumer Ignorance and the Reciprocal Termination Charges," Discussion Papers 09/19, Department of Economics, University of York.
    7. John A. Weinberg, 1999. "Interconnection and Rivalry between Banks," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-15, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    8. Hahn, Jong-Hee, 2003. "Nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 949-967, September.
    9. Joan Calzada & Francesc Trillas, 2005. "The interconnection prices in telecomunications: from theory to practice," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 173(2), pages 85-125, June.
    10. Vogelsang, Ingo, 2000. "Regulation of Access to the Telecommunications Network of New Zealand: A Review of the Literature," Working Paper Series 3931, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    11. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1997. "The check float puzzle," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 1-26.
    12. Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Lim, Yoonsung, 2001. "An economic analysis of the receiver pays principle," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 231-260, June.
    13. Edmond Baranes, 1998. "Réglementation et ouverture à la concurrence des activités en réseaux : le cas des télécommunications," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 13(4), pages 161-186.
    14. Baranes, E. & Flochel, L., 2003. "Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities," Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) 03.10.37, CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
    15. Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, 2008. "Matching rules," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(1), pages 57-70.
    16. James J. McAndrews & William Roberds, 1997. "A model of check exchange," Working Papers 97-16, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    17. Carlo Cambini, 2000. "Competition between Vertically Integrated Networks: a Generalized Model," ICER Working Papers 01-2000, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    18. Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Interconnection Negotiations between Telecommunication Networks and Universal Service Objectives," UCLA Economics Online Papers 348, UCLA Department of Economics.
    19. Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 2003. "Asymmetric Network Interconnection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 22(1), pages 27-46, February.
    20. Stefan Buehler, 1999. "A Further Look at Two-way Network Competition in Telecommunications," SOI - Working Papers 9904, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Apr 2000.
    21. Gilo, David & Spiegel, Yossi, 2004. "Network interconnection with competitive transit," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 439-458, September.
    22. David Gilo & Yossi Spiegel, 2003. "Network Interconnection With Competitive Transit," Working Papers 03-05, NET Institute, revised Dec 2003.
    23. Hahn, Jong-Hee, 2004. "Network competition and interconnection with heterogeneous subscribers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 611-631, May.
    24. Ingo Vogelsang, 2003. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(3), pages 830-862, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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