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Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities Concurrence et fusions entre réseaux avec externalités d’appels

Author

Listed:
  • Edmond Baranes

    (Université Montpellier 1)

  • Laurent Flochel

Abstract

This paper considers a model of two interconnected networks with different qualities. There are call externalities in the sense that consumers value calls they send and receive. Networks compete in two part tariffs. We show that call externalities create private incentives for each competitor to charge low access prices. This result moderates the risk of tacit collusion when competitors can freely negotiate their access charges. We also analyze the case of a merger between the two networks and give conditions under which the merger can be welfare improving.

Suggested Citation

  • Edmond Baranes & Laurent Flochel, 2003. "Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities Concurrence et fusions entre réseaux avec externalités d’appels," Working Papers 0308, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:0308
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicholas Economides & Giuseppe Lopomo & Glenn Woroch, 1997. "Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing," Industrial Organization 9701001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    3. Julian Wright, 2002. "Access Pricing under Competition: An Application to Cellular Networks," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 289-315, September.
    4. Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 2003. "Asymmetric Network Interconnection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 22(1), pages 27-46, February.
    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 38-56, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    call externalities; interconnection; mergers; telecommunications;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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