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Un modelo de entrada y competencia en telecomunicaciones

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Abstract

La liberalización de las telecomunicaciones ha llevado a la introducción de competencia en todos sus mercados, incluso al nivel de la telefonía local. En este artículo se modela la decisión de entrada de un competidor al monopolio preestablecido, con la posterior competencia en precios en un mercado desregulado y finalmente la decisión de los consumidores respecto a que red subscribirse. El principal resultado de este trabajo es que la nueva empresa invertirá en una cobertura no superior al 40% del mercado, con lo cual la posibilidad de entrada y competencia de facilidades producirá un mercado competitivo con firmas de diferente tamaño. Se encuentra también que la política de entrada asistida con cargos de acceso asimétricos, favorables a la empresa entrante, sólo podría aumentar la cobertura de equilibrio de esta empresa hasta el límite ya mencionado, política pagada por los consumidores al aumentar los precios de equilibrio. En términos de eficiencia, la entrada asistida de una nueva firma produce en general una pérdida en el bienestar de los consumidores y en el bienestar social.

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  • Xavier Mancero & Eduardo Saavedra, 2006. "Un modelo de entrada y competencia en telecomunicaciones," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv171, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  • Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv171
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    Cited by:

    1. Agostini, Claudio & Saavedra, Eduardo H., 2013. "Chile: Port congestion and efficient rationing in cargo transfer operations," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.

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    Keywords

    Subasta; Energía; Abastecimiento incierto; Racionamiento Eléctrico;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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