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El control de los precios excesivos en el derecho de la libre competencia: análisis y propuesta

Author

Listed:
  • Eduardo Saavedra

    (Universidad Alberto Hurtado)

  • Javier Tapia

    (Abogado)

Abstract

El control de los precios excesivos por autoridades de competencia ha sido objeto de mucha controversia a nivel global. En este artículo se argumenta a favor de tal control de una forma restrictiva, de modo que no conlleve un peligro para la innovación o las inversiones en I+D y sea compatible con diversos objetivos de la política de libre competencia. Luego de analizar la situación actual en Latinoamérica, se propone un test de aplicación más sencilla que los tradicionalmente utilizados en el derecho comparado, lo que permitiría superar los problemas prácticos tradicionalmente mencionados en la literatura y la jurisprudencia. El test consta de tres etapas. En primer lugar, se debe determinar si la firma acusada es “superdominante†en el mercado relevante, en cuyo caso se pasa a la etapa siguiente. En ésta se determina si el precio cobrado excede cierto umbral crítico de precios, el que corresponde al mayor valor entre un precio basado en costos y otro que impondría una empresa dominante con una participación de mercado igual al parámetro definido para la superdominancia. De superarse este umbral, en una tercera etapa la firma superdominante tendría la oportunidad de justificar su práctica de precios excesivos en, por ejemplo, la existencia de inversiones hundidas, el resultado de innovación o su definición como una empresa multiproducto o una plataforma

Suggested Citation

  • Eduardo Saavedra & Javier Tapia, 2019. "El control de los precios excesivos en el derecho de la libre competencia: análisis y propuesta," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(153), pages 95-140.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpt:journl:v::y:2019:i:153:p:95-140
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    excessive pricing; competition policy; free competition; abuse of dominant position;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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