Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm
We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.
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