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Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

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  • Tasnádi, Attila

Abstract

We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.

Suggested Citation

  • Tasnádi, Attila, 2009. "Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm," MPRA Paper 13612, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13612
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    Cited by:

    1. Krešimir Žigić, 2012. "Stackelberg leadership with product differentiation and endogenous entry: some comparative static and limiting results," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 106(3), pages 221-232, July.
    2. Federico Etro, 2010. "Endogenous market structures and antitrust policy," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 57(1), pages 9-45, March.
    3. Šrédl, K. & Mikhalkina, E., 2014. "Competition among Companies in the Fast Food Market in the Czech Republic," AGRIS on-line Papers in Economics and Informatics, Czech University of Life Sciences Prague, Faculty of Economics and Management, vol. 6(4), pages 1-14, December.
    4. Susumu Cato & Ryoko Oki, 2012. "Leaders and competitors," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 107(3), pages 239-255, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Forchheimer; Dominant firm; Price leadership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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