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Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm

  • Attila Tasnádi

    ()

We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer's model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer's model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00712-010-0108-5
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 99 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 251-266

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:99:y:2010:i:3:p:251-266
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909

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  1. Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
  2. Jacqueline Morgan & Lina Mallozzi & Sjur D. Flåm, 2002. "A new look for Stackelberg-Cournot equilibria in oligopolistic markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(1), pages 183-188.
  3. Tasnadi, Attila, 2000. "A price-setting game with a nonatomic fringe," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 63-69, October.
  4. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 1999. "Quantity-setting oligopoly with endogenous sequencing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 289-296, February.
  5. Tesoriere, Antonio, 2008. "Endogenous timing with infinitely many firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1381-1388, November.
  6. Sadanand, Asha & Sadanand, Venkatraman, 1996. "Firm Scale and the Endogenous Timing of Entry: a Choice between Commitment and Flexibility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 516-530, August.
  7. Raymond J. Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, 1992. "Price Leadership," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 143-162.
    • Raymond Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, 1988. "Price Leadership," Discussion Papers 773, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Anderson, Simon P & Engers, Maxim, 1994. "Strategic Investment and Timing of Entry," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 833-53, November.
  9. Christophe Caron & Thierry Lafay, 2008. "How Risk Disciplines Pre-Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 205-226, November.
  10. Stephen J. Rassenti & Bart J. Wilson, 2004. "How Applicable is the Dominant Firm Model of Price Leadership?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 271-288, October.
  11. Anderson, Simon P. & Engers, Maxim, 1992. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 127-135, March.
  12. Tasnadi, Attila, 2004. "On Forchheimer's model of dominant firm price leadership," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 275-279, August.
  13. Ono, Yoshiyasu, 1982. "Price Leadership: A Theoretical Analysis," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 49(193), pages 11-20, February.
  14. Novshek, William., 1983. "Perfectly Competitive Markets as the Limits of Cournot Markets," Working Papers 499, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  15. Robson, Arthur J, 1990. "Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg Regained," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(2), pages 263-74, May.
  16. Daughety, Andrew F, 1990. "Beneficial Concentration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1231-37, December.
  17. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
  18. Federico Etro, 2007. "Stackelberg competition with endogenous entry," Working Papers 121, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 2007.
  19. R. J. Ruffin, 1971. "Cournot Oligopoly and Competitive Behaviour," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(4), pages 493-502.
  20. Szidarovszky, F & Yakowitz, S, 1977. "A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 18(3), pages 787-89, October.
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