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Endogenous market structures and antitrust policy

  • Federico Etro

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s12232-009-0088-3
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Article provided by Springer & Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS) in its journal International Review of Economics.

Volume (Year): 57 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 9-45

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Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:57:y:2010:i:1:p:9-45
DOI: 10.1007/s12232-009-0088-3
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

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Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/policy/journal/12232/PS2

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  1. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
  2. Federico Etro, 2008. "Endogenous Market Structures and Strategic Trade Policy," Working Papers 149, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2008.
  3. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521816632, Junio.
  4. Federico Etro, 2006. "Aggressive leaders," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 146-154, 03.
  5. Boone, J., 2000. "Competition," Discussion Paper 2000-104, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Ivan Ledezma, 2010. "Defensive Strategies in the Quality Ladders," Working Papers DT/2010/11, DIAL (Développement, Institutions et Mondialisation).
  7. F. Etro, 2007. "Endogenous Market Structures and Macroeconomic Theory," Review of Business and Economic Literature, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Review of Business and Economic Literature, vol. 0(4), pages 517-540.
  8. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Triole, 2002. "Platform Competition in Two Sided Markets," FMG Discussion Papers dp409, Financial Markets Group.
  9. Federico Etro, 2008. "Stackelberg Competition with Endogenous Entry," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1670-1697, October.
  10. Tasnádi, Attila, 2009. "Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm," MPRA Paper 13612, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-65, March.
  12. Kesternich, Iris & Schumacher, Heiner, 2009. "On the Use of Information in Repeated Insurance Markets," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 280, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  13. Creane, Anthony & Konishi, Hideo, 2009. "The unilateral incentives for technology transfers: Predation (and deterrence) by proxy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 379-389, May.
  14. Tesoriere, Antonio, 2008. "Endogenous timing with infinitely many firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1381-1388, November.
  15. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1998. "Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Levine's Working Paper Archive 245, David K. Levine.
  16. Daughety, Andrew F, 1990. "Beneficial Concentration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1231-37, December.
  17. Bruno Amable & Lilas Demmou & Ivan Ledezma, 2010. "Product market regulation, innovation, and distance to frontier," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00464902, HAL.
  18. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 131-50, June.
  19. Barry Nalebuff, 2004. "Bundling as an Entry Barrier," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(1), pages 159-187.
  20. Färnstrand Damsgaard, Erika, 2009. "Patent Scope and Technology Choice," Working Paper Series 792, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  21. John Vickers, 2010. "Competition Policy and Property Rights," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(544), pages 375-392, 05.
  22. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, Junio.
  23. Nisvan Erkal & Daniel Piccinin, 2006. "Horizontal Mergers with Free Entry in Differentiated Oligopolies," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 976, The University of Melbourne.
  24. Davidson, Carl & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2007. "Horizontal mergers with free entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 157-172, February.
  25. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
  26. Erkal, Nisvan & Piccinin, Daniel, 2010. "Cooperative R&D under uncertainty with free entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 74-85, January.
  27. Werden, G.J. & Froeb, L.M., 1996. "The Entry Including Effects of Horizontal Mergers," Papers 96-08, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
  28. Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
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