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Stackelberg competition with endogenous entry

  • Federico Etro

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca)

This paper analyzes market structures where leaders have a first mover advantage and entry by the followers is endogenous. The strategy of the leaders is always more aggressive than the strategy of the followers independently from strategic substitutability or complementarity. Under quantity competition, the leader produces more than any other firm and I determine the conditions for entry deterrence to be optimal (high substitutability and constant or decreasing marginal costs). Under price competition, the leader sets a lower price than each follower, just the opposite than with an exogenous number of firms. In contests the leader invests more than each follower. In all these cases a leadership improves the allocation of resources compared to the Nash equilibrium with endogenous entry.

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File URL: http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper121.pdf
File Function: First version, 2007
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Paper provided by University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 121.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision: 2007
Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:121
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  1. Rabah Amir & Val E. Lambson, 1998. "On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets," CIE Discussion Papers 1998-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  2. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
  3. Anderson, Simon P. & Engers, Maxim, 1992. "Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 127-135, March.
  4. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521016919 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, June.
  6. Gilbert, Richard & Vives, Xavier, 1986. "Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 71-83, January.
  7. W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Harrington & John M. Vernon, 2005. "Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 4th Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 4, volume 1, number 026222075x, June.
  8. Vives, Xavier, 1988. "Sequential entry, industry structure and welfare," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1671-1687, October.
  9. Federico Etro, 2006. "Market Leaders and Industrial Policy," Working Papers 103, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2006.
  10. Etro, Federico, 2008. "Growth leaders," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 1148-1172, September.
  11. Federico Etro, 2004. "Innovation by leaders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 281-303, 04.
  12. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
  13. Segerstrom, Paul S., 1999. "Intel Economics," Working Paper Series 524, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    • Paul S. Segerstrom, 2007. "Intel Economics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(1), pages 247-280, 02.
  14. Anderson, Simon P & Engers, Maxim, 1994. "Strategic Investment and Timing of Entry," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(4), pages 833-53, November.
  15. Federico Etro, 2006. "Aggressive leaders," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 146-154, 03.
  16. Franco Modigliani, 1958. "New Developments on the Oligopoly Front," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66, pages 215.
  17. TESORIERE, Antonio, 2006. "Endogenous timing with free entry," CORE Discussion Papers 2006093, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  18. Glenn C. Loury, 1976. "Market Structure and Innovation," Discussion Papers 256, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  19. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521816632 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Nisvan Erkal & Daniel Piccinin, 2006. "Horizontal Mergers with Free Entry in Differentiated Oligopolies," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 976, The University of Melbourne.
  21. Davidson, Carl & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2007. "Horizontal mergers with free entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 157-172, February.
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