Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
The public good aspect of entry prevention is examined in an industry characterized by an established oligopoly facing a potential entrant. Although incumbent firms act noncooperatively, underinvestment in entry-deterrence does not occur and in fact incumbents may find themselves in a Pareto dominated arrangement (in terms of profits) by preventing entry.
Volume (Year): 53 (1986)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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