Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm
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More about this item
KeywordsForchheimer; Dominant firm; Price leadership.;
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2009-09-26 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2009-09-26 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2009-09-26 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2009-09-26 (Microeconomics)
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