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Two‐sided markets: a progress report

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  • Jean‐Charles Rochet
  • Jean Tirole

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  • Jean‐Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Two‐sided markets: a progress report," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:37:y:2006:i:3:p:645-667
    DOI: j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    2. Armstrong, M., 1996. "Network interconnection," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9625, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    3. Doh-Shin Jeon & Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2004. "On the Receiver-Pays Principle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 85-110, Spring.
    4. Attila Ambrus & Rossella Argenziano, 2004. "Network Markets and Consumers Coordination," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1481, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Kind, Hans Jarle & Nilssen, Tore & Sørgard, Lars, 2005. "Advertising on TV: Under- or Overprovision?," Memorandum 15/2005, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    6. Gans Joshua S & King Stephen P, 2003. "The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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