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Chile: Port congestion and efficient rationing in cargo transfer operations

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  • Agostini, Claudio
  • Saavedra, Eduardo H.

Abstract

No pricing system is likely to be able to do away with congestion in port cargo transfer operations at peak times, since port use is determined not so much by seasonal factors as, first and foremost, by the simultaneous arrival of vessels, which results in rationing. This article shows that rationing, to be efficient, needs to go by the value of the cargo transferred rather than following a first-come-first-served rule. It demonstrates that efficient rationing gives priority to containerized cargo, followed by break bulk cargo, with bulk cargo in last place. These findings are applied to cargo transfer at the San Antonio Terminal Internacional franchised port in Chile.

Suggested Citation

  • Agostini, Claudio & Saavedra, Eduardo H., 2013. "Chile: Port congestion and efficient rationing in cargo transfer operations," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecr:col070:37008
    Note: Includes bibliography.
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    Cited by:

    1. Naima Saeed & Dong-Wook Song & Otto Andersen, 2018. "Governance mode for port congestion mitigation: A transaction cost perspective," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 159-178, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    PUERTOS; TRANSPORTE MARITIMO; TRANSPORTE DE MERCANCIAS; TARIFAS PORTUARIAS; ADMINISTRACION DE PUERTOS; EFICIENCIA COMERCIAL; MODELOS MATEMATICOS; ESTUDIOS DE CASOS; PORTS; MARITIME TRANSPORT; GOODS TRANSPORT; PORT CHARGES; PORT MANAGEMENT; TRADE EFFICIENCY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; CASE STUDIES;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General

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