Investments and Network Competition
We analyze the impact of two-way access charges on the incentives to invest in networks with different levels of quality. When quality has an impact on all calls initiated by customers (destined both on-net and off-net), we obtain a result of ``tacit collusion" even in a symmetric model with two-part pricing. Firms tend to underinvest in quality, and this is exacerbated if they can negotiate reciprocal termination charges above cost. When the quality of off-net calls depends on the interaction between the quality of the two networks, no network has an incentive to jump ahead of its rival by investing more.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 36 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.rje.org|
|Order Information:||Web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Peitz, Martin, 2005. "Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 341-358, February.
- Economides, Nicholas, 1999.
"Quality choice and vertical integration,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 903-914, August.
- Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-564, May.
- Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 2003. "Asymmetric Network Interconnection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 22(1), pages 27-46, February.
- Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso M., 2003. "Network competition with price discrimination: 'bill-and-keep' is not so bad after all," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 205-213, November.
- Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2001.
"Using 'bill and keep' interconnect arrangements to soften network competition,"
Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 413-420, June.
- Gans, J.S. & King, S.P., 2000. "Using 'Bill and Keep' Interconnect Arrangements to Soften Network Competiti on," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 739, The University of Melbourne.
- Armstrong, M., 1996. "Network interconnection," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9625, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- de Bijl,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2003.
"Regulation and Entry into Telecommunications Markets,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521808378, May.
- de Bijl,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2008. "Regulation and Entry into Telecommunications Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521066631, May.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:2:p:446-468. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.