Vertical Integration and Shared Facilities in Unregulated Industries
In this paper we consider a market situation in which initially there is an unintegrated monopoly upstream that owns an essential facility and two downstream firms. Then the market is liberalized allowing upstream entry and vertical integration. The equilibrium entry mode--sharing the incumbent facility or building a new facility--is derived as well as the equilibrium market structure. Several policy prescriptions are set forth.
|Date of creation:||13 Apr 2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Georgetown University Department of Economics Washington, DC 20057-1036|
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