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Integración Vertical Eficiente y Compartimiento de Facilidades en Presencia de Entrada: Un Marco Conceptual




En este artículo se estudian los equilibrios de mercado resultantes en una industria de facilidades esenciales, con un monopolio upstream y competencia oligopólica downstream, la que enfrenta posteriormente entrada en el segmento monopólico. Se encuentra que la competencia de duopolios verticalmente integrados es el resultado de equilibrio postentrada, con competencia de facilidades esenciales cuando los costos de construcción de una nueva facilidad son bajos y con compartimiento de la facilidad esencial upstream cuando sus costos de construcción son elevados. Asimismo, los efectos en bienestar social son siempre eÞcientes cuando se observa duplicación de facilidades; siendo en varios casos eÞcientes cuando se observa en equilibrio compartimiento de facilidades. Estos resultados proveen racionalidad para la mantener desregulada industrias como la petrolera, en donde los costos hundidos son más bien bajos relativos al tamaño del mercado.

Suggested Citation

  • Felipe Balmaceda & Eduardo Saavedra, 2005. "Integración Vertical Eficiente y Compartimiento de Facilidades en Presencia de Entrada: Un Marco Conceptual," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv168, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  • Handle: RePEc:ila:ilades:inv168

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Felipe Balmaceda(University of Chile), Eduardo Saavedra(Georgetown University/Ilades), 2004. "Vertical Integration and Shared Facilities in Unregulated Industries," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-13, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    2. Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Long, 1996. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 409-432, September.
    3. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-142, March.
    4. Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356.
    5. Mandy, David M, 2000. "Killing the Goose That May Have Laid the Golden Egg: Only the Data Know Whether Sabotage Pays," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 157-172, March.
    6. Dixit, Avinash, 1980. "The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(357), pages 95-106, March.
    7. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1987. "Cost-Raising Strategies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 19-34, September.
    8. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
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    More about this item


    Facilidad esencial; Inversiones compartidas; Competencia de redes;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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