Upstream-Downstream Specialization by Integrated Firms in a Partially Integraded Industry
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the effect of upstream cost asymmetries on the behavior of integrated firms. The model highlights the respective roles of strategic considerations and of cost considerations in the determination of an integrated firm's interaction with the non integrated sector of the industry, on its relative upstream-downstream specialization.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: G.R.E.Q.A.M., (GROUPE DE RECHERCHE EN ECONOMIE QUANTITATIVE D'AIX MARSEILLE), CENTRE DE VIEILLE CHARITE, 2 RUE DE LA CHARITE, 13002 MARSEILLE.|
Web page: http://www.greqam.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-271, May.
- Gaudet, Gerard & Long, Ngo Van, 1994.
"On the effects of the distribution of initial endowments in a nonrenewable resource duopoly,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 1189-1198, November.
- Gérard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1991. "On the Effects of the Distribution of Initial Endowments in a non Renewable Resource Duopoly," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9202, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Perry, Martin K., 1989. "Vertical integration: Determinants and effects," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 183-255 Elsevier.
- Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Long, 1996. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 409-432, 09.
- Gérard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1993. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure and Profits in the Presence of Double Marginalisation," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9308, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
- Gérard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1995. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure and Profits in the Presence of Double Marginalisation," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-40, CIRANO.
- Hart, O. & Tirole, J., 1990. "Vertical Integration And Market Foreclosure," Working papers 548, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-265, March.
- Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-142, March.
- Adelman, M. A., 1991. "User cost in oil production," Resources and Energy, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 217-240, September.
- Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:aixmeq:96b13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.