Interconnection and Rivalry between Banks
This is an incomplete draft of a paper that will examine the competitive tension that arises when banks which compete for deposits provide "interconnecting" payment services to each other's depositors. This draft presents a basic theoretical model and discusses some of the analysis that can be carried out and issues that can be addressed with the model.
|Date of creation:||Aug 1999|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 3301 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104.6367|
Web page: http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/
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- Nicholas Economides & Giuseppe Lopomo & Glenn Woroch, 2005.
"Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing,"
05-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Nicholas Economides & Giuseppe Lopomo & Glenn Woroch, 1997. "Strategic Commitments and the Principle of Reciprocity in Interconnection Pricing," Industrial Organization 9701001, EconWPA.
- Mcandrews, James, 1998.
"Direct presentment regulation in payments,"
Research in Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 311-326, September.
- James J. McAndrews & William Roberds, 1999.
"Payment intermediation and the origins of banking,"
85, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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